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premises.3 It has been said that the latter is to be reasonably interpreted as
meaning that the place is to be designated with sufficient accuracy to prevent
the officer from searching the premises of one person under a warrant directed
against those of another, and does not necessarily require a minute and de-
tailed description of the property to be searched.
4
With reference to these constitutional provisions, authorities, in challenging
the validity of search warrants, have applied the following tests: The officer
must have been able to locate the premises with certainty,5 reasonable cer-
tainty,6 definitely and with certainty,7 with reasonable effort,s without the
use of his discretion, 9 or without outside assistance. 10 Similarly a warrant has
been held valid if clear of ambiguity," or if it pointed out the place to the
exclusion of others and led the officer unerringly to it.
12
Although North Dakota has no case in point, it is submitted that they will
honor the more liberal view in giving effect to a search warrant wherein the
description of the premises is erroneously stated.
THEODORE KESSEL, JR.
TORTS - EFFECT OF MARRIAGE - RIGsrr OF WIFE To SUE DivoRcED Hus-
BAND FOR TORT COmMITrED PRIOR TO MARRIAGE. - Plaintiff was injured while
riding with defendant and brought action for personal injuries. Upon subse-
quent marriage of parties, action was dismissed without prejudice. Two years
later the husband obtained a divorce. Plaintiff appeals from trial court's re-
fusal to grant plaintiff's motion to reopen the original action. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey held, two justices dissenting, that plaintiff could not in-
stitute her original action. Without reaching the question whether the divorce
revives an action for a prenuptial tort which was barred by marriage of the
parties, the majority decided the change in relationship between the parties
3. U.S. Const. amend. IV. N.D. Const. art. I, § 18 provides that. "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons and things to be seized".
N.D. Rev. Code § 29-2906 (1943) employs the phrase "reasonable particularity"
rather than "particularly describing".
4. State v. Nejin, 140 La. 793, 74 So. 103 (1917).
5. State v. John, 103 W. Va. 148, 136 S.E. 842 (1927).
6; Thompson v. State, 197 Tenn. App. 112, 270 S.W.2d 379 (1954); Chruscicki v.
Hinricks, 197 Wis. 78, 221 N.W. 394 (1928) (Correct owner's name, but incorrect range
and section numbers, held, valid).
7. United States v. Borkowski, 268 Fed. 72 (S.D. Ohio 1920).
8. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925).
9. Stone v. State, 276 P.2d 799 (Okla. 1954); Wallace v. State, 89 Okla. Crim. 365,
208 P.2d 190 (1949). See Rose v. State, 171 Ind. 662, 87 N.E. 103 (1909); People v.
Musk, 221 Mich. 578, 192 N.W. 485 (1923) (Accused was released due to use of dis-
cretion on part of officer).
10. Hedges v. State, 97 Okla. Crim. 402, 265 P.2d 737 (1954); Dawson v. State, 90
Okla. Crim. 30, 210 P.2d 209 (1949) wherein range 19W as contained in the warrant
did not exist; the intended range being 19WIM-West of Indian Meridian. Held, des-
cription sufficient, because the officer was able to locate the place without the aid of
any information save that contained in the warrant. See Cotton v. State, 83 Okla. Crim.
349, 177 P.2d 155 (1947).
11. Dolen v. State, 187 Tenn. App. 663, 216 S.W.2d 351 (1948) (The court said
particularly means absence of ambiguity); Thompson v. Carson, 186 Tenn. App. 170,
208 S.W.2d 1019 (1948).
12. Jackson v. State, 87 Fla. 262, 99 So. 548 (1924); Bonner v. State, 210 Ga. 475,
80 So.2d 683 (1955) wherein the warrant included Pensacola as part of the address of
the premises to be searched, where, in reality, said premises were outside city limits,
held, description valid.
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as a result of the divorce was insufficient cause to vacate dismissal. The dissent
reasoned the marriage merely disabled the wife's cause of action while the
parties continued as husband and wife, and the divorce should have dissipated
the plaintiff's non-ability to sue. Greenberg v. Owens, 157 A.2d 689 (N. J.
1960).
At common law, a wife and husband were considered a single legal entity;
therefore, a cause of action for a tort committed during coverture did not
arise.' Although the various Married Women's Acts have secured for the wife
a separate legal identity from her husband and a separate legal estate in her
own property,2 the majority of courts adhere to the common law rule as to
tort liability between spouses. 3 Strict construction of the Married Women's
Acts is one of the reasons for following the common law rule.4 Other reasons
for denying a cause of action to the injured spouse are that these suits will
disrupt the domestic tranquility of the homes and will result in collusive suits
against insurance companies. 6
An increasing minority of states hold that by the enactment of the Married
Women's Acts one spouse may sue the other for tort,7 relying on liberal in-
terpretation of these Acts8 and rebutting the doctrine of disruption of domestic
tranquility9 and the danger of collusive suits against insurance companies.' 0
In antenuptial tort actions the majority of.the courts also disallow recovery
on the basis that the subsequent marriage extinguishes any right of action.
1
'
The courts following the minority rule as to torts committed during coverture
between spouses allow recovery for an antenuptial tort reasoning that a woman
1 1. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 614 (1910); Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103
Pac 220 (1909); Holman v. Holman, 73 Ga. App. 205, 35 S.E.2d 923 (1945); Kaczo-
rowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 At. 663 (1936).
2. See PROSSER, TORTS § 101 (2d ed. 1955).
3. Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 Pac. 220 (1909); Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d
774 (Fla. 1950); Hinter v. Livingston, 125 Ind. App. 422, 123 N.E.2d 912 (1955);
Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 136 At. 534 (1927); Lubowitz v. Taines, 293
Mass. 39, 198 N.E. 320 (1936); Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107 N.W. 1047 (1906);
Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924); Browner v. Browner, 327 S.W.2d
808 (Mo. 1959); Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922 (1932); Romero v.
Romero, 58 N.M. 201, 269 P.2d 748 (1954); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87
P.2d 660 (1938); Comstock v. Comstock, 106 Vt. 50, 169 Atl. 903 (1934); Poling v.
Poling, 116 W.Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935); See, Edleman v. Edleman, 183 Ga. 778,
189 S.E. 835 (1937).
4. Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950). See, Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah2d 404,
275 P.2d 696, (1954) (dictum); McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d
940 (1943).
5.'Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217, 239 P.2d 933 (1952); Patenaude v. Patenaude, 195
Minn. 523, 263 N.W. 546 (1935).
6. See Harvey v. Harvey, 239 Mich. 142, 214 N.W. 305 (1927).
.7. Brandt v. Keller, 413 Ill. 503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1952); Brown v. Gosser, 262
S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953); Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45, 102 S.E. 787 (1922). See
Fontaine v. Fontaine, 205 Wis. 570, 238 N.W. 410 (1931).
8. Brandt v. Keller, 413 Ill. 503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1952); Prosser v. Prosser, 114
S.C. 45, 102 S.E. 787 (1922); Scotvold v. Scotvold, 66 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941).
9. Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Old. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938).
10. See Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740, 743 (1935).
11. Spector v. Weisman, 40 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1930); Carmicheal v. Carmicheal
53 Ga. App. 663, 187 S.E. 116 (1936); Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 44 N.E.
462 (1896); Scales v. Scales, 168 Miss. 439, 151 So. 551 (1934); Wolfer v. Oehlers, 8
N. J. Super. 434, 73 A.2d 95 (1950); Fury v. Fury, 193 Va. 727, 71 S.E.2d 191 (1952);
Stats v. Co-operative Transit Co., 125 W. Va. 473, 24 S.E.2d 916 (1943); Buckeye v.
Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931). See Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn.
415, 55 S.W.2d 263, 264 (1932).
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retains whatever cause of action she had for injuries to her personal property
before marriage.'2
North Dakota follows the minority view, allowing a wife to bring an action
for personal injuries caused by husband's negligence during coverture.1
3
In the cases regarding a divorce and subsequent action for a tort committed
during coverture, it is generally held that the divorce does not dissipate the
wife's non-ability to sue.' 4 However, in two recent decisions, one jurisdiction
held that a wife may maintain an action for a tort committed during marriage
after the final divorce decree, 15 and another jurisdiction held that a wife can
recover for an intentional tort committed during the interlocutory period of
divorce."',
It is submitted that the unique situation of an antenuptial tort coupled with
the subsequent divorce of the parties should permit the cause of action to be
sounded. If subsequent marriage suppresses the right of action, subsequent
divorce, by the same reasoning should revive it.
CHARLES R. HUDDLESON.
12. Foote v. Foote, 170 Cal. App.2d 435, 339 P.2d 188 (1959); Hamilton v. Fulker-
son, 285 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1955) (the court allowed recovery for an antenuptial tort
but stated that torts commited during coverture do not give rise to a cause of action).
See Shirley v. Ayers, 201 N.C. 51, 158 S.E. 840 (1931).
13. Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932).
14. Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 44 N.E. 462 (1896) (this case involved a
prenuptial tort instead of one committed during coverture); Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass.
550, 78 N.E.2d 637 (1948); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 Pac. 629 (1911).
See Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898); Strom v. Strom, 98
Minn. 427, 107 N.W. 1047 (1906).
15. Gremillon v. Caffey, 71 So.2d 670 (La. 1954).
16. Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954).
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